West Law Report

Extradition time extension

Posted in Extradition, time limit, Times Law Report by mrkooenglish on June 9, 2008

From The TimesJune 2, 2008

Extradition time extension
Queen’s Bench Divisional Court

Published June 2, 2008

Moulai v Deputy Public Prosecutor, Creteil

Late service of a copy of a duly filed appeal notice was not a fatal bar to an appeal against an extradition order.

The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court (Lord Justice Hooper and Mr Justice Maddison) so held on May 9, 2008, when determining that it had jurisdiction, under rule 3.1(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules, to extend the time limit for service of a notice of appeal filed by Lofti Moulai against District Judge Anthony Evans who, on March 14, 2008, ordered his extradition to Cretail, France.

LORD JUSTICE HOOPER said that but for the provisions of section 26(4) of the Extradition Act 2003 the court would have had the jurisdiction to waive the time limit.

The words “notice of an appeal must be given” in section 26(4) referred to the filing, and not the service of the notice of appeal.

The judgments of the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court in both District Court of Vilnius City v Barcys ([2007] 1 WLR 3249), which decided that a failure to serve the appeal notice could not be waived, and Gercans v Government of Latvia ([2008] EWHC 884 (Admin)), which held that there was no power to extend the time for service of the notice of appeal, were wrong.


Posted in time limit, Westlaw Reports by mrkooenglish on June 4, 2008

Last Updated: 3:21PM BST 04/06/2008
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Waller, Keene and Carnwath LJJ May 22, 2008

Compensation – EC law – Minors – Motor Insurers’ Bureau – Principle of equivalence – Road traffic accidents – Time limits – Untraced drivers – Compatibility with EC law of time limit for bringing claims under untraced drivers agreement – Liability for Francovich damages – Limitation Act 1980 – Directive 84/5 on Insurance against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles 1983 – s. 28 Limitation Act 1980


The appellant MIB and secretary of state appealed against a decision ([2007] EWHC 1268 (QB), [2008] 2 WLR 234) on preliminary issues relating to the 1972 Untraced Drivers Agreement between the MIB and the Department of Transport. The respondent (B) had been injured by a car in a hit-and-run incident in June 1993 when he was three years old. The car did not stop and the driver was never traced. Some eight years later B’s parents became aware of the possibility of claiming compensation from the MIB and submitted a claim on B’s behalf. The claim was rejected as outside the three-year time limit in the Untraced Drivers Agreement. When he was 16, B began proceedings against the MIB and the secretary of state claiming that the Agreement, interpreted in accordance with Community law, conferred a right to make an application to the MIB within time limits no less favourable than those in the Limitation Act 1980, which contained a provision suspending the limitation period during a claimant’s minority. The judge made declarations that on the true construction of Directive 84/5 and/or by virtue of the Community principle of equivalence, the MIB procedure should be subject to a limitation period no less favourable than that which applied to the commencement of actions in the courts in respect of claims brought by minors for personal injury in tort against a traced driver; and that the United Kingdom was in sufficiently serious breach of its obligations under Community law to give rise in principle to liability in damages for failure to ensure conformity with the Directive in that respect. The appellants submitted that the requirement to provide protection equivalent to that provided in respect of identified and insured drivers under the court system was concerned only with the amount of compensation.


Whether the requirement to provide protection equivalent to that provided in respect of identified and insured drivers under the court system was concerned only with the amount of compensation.

HELD (appeal dismissed)

(1) The European Court of Justice had ruled that the protection provided by the national scheme had to be equivalent to and as effective as the protection available under the national legal system to victims of insured drivers, Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (C63/01) [2005] All ER (EC) 763 ECJ (5th Chamber) applied. There was no reason to adopt a more restrictive meaning.

(2) Clause 1(1)(f) of the Untraced Drivers Agreement precluded any application made more than three years after the accident. By contrast, a claim in tort in court proceedings against an insured driver could have been brought by B at any time prior to his 21st birthday, by virtue of s. 28 of the 1980 Act. The same would have applied to a claim against an identified but uninsured driver whose liability was covered by the Uninsured Drivers Agreement. Once that was accepted as the appropriate comparison, the conclusion was unavoidable that the Untraced Drivers Agreement gave less favourable treatment. It did not make any material difference that there might be other procedural advantages to the MIB scheme. The competing procedures needed to be looked at as a whole but the claimed advantages of the MIB scheme did not justify the much shorter time limit. In order to meet its intended role as implementing the Directive, the MIB agreement should be subject to a limitation period no less favourable than that which applied to the commencement of court proceedings by a minor under s. 28.

(3) The UK’s failure to comply with the Directive was sufficiently serious to expose it to a claim for Francovich damages. The ECJ judgment in Evans was an authoritative statement of the legal context in which the Untraced Drivers Agreement had to be considered and contained an unambiguous statement of the need to ensure equivalence with the system for insured drivers. The “sufficiently serious” criterion laid down by the ECJ for Francovich liability required a value judgment by the national court, taking account of the various factors summarised by the court in Evans. In the instant case the important points which established liability in principle were the relative precision of the requirement, following Evans; the serious consequences of failure to comply; and the clear warning given in Evans of the need to make the comparison.

Nicholas Paines QC and Josh Holmes (instructed by Pinto Potts, Aldershot) for the respondent. Dermod O’Brien QC and Fergus Randolph (instructed by Greenwoods, Knaresborough) for the first appellant. Jonathan Crow QC, Jemima Stratford and David Barr (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) for the second appellant.